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jeffrey l. handwerker,* matthew h. solomson,** mahnu v. davar,*** & 
kathleen h. harne**** 
Congress Declares Checkmate: How the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 Strengthens 
the Civil False Claims Act and Counters the Courts 
i. introduction 
The civil false claims act (fca)1 is one of the most effective tools in the 
federal government’s arsenal to combat schemes that defraud, and attempt to 
defraud, the United States treasury and, by extension, the country’s taxpayers. In 
fiscal year 2009, the United States recovered $2.4 billion in settlements and 
judgments under the FCA, representing the second largest annual recovery in the 
Act’s history.2 Since 1986, when the FCA was last strengthened legislatively, total 
recoveries have exceeded $24 billion.3 The 1986 amendments enhanced the FCA 
primarily by revising its qui tam provisions to encourage whistleblowers to come 
forward with allegations of fraud.4 

© 2010 Jeffrey L. Handwerker, Matthew H. Solomson, Mahnu V. Davar, Kathleen H. Harne. The views 
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Department of Justice, the University of Maryland, or Arnold & Porter LLP or its clients. 
 *  Jeffrey L. Handwerker is a Partner in Arnold & Porter LLP’s FDA HealthCare, Litigation and 
Government Contracts groups and has represented clients in litigation under the federal and state false claims 
acts and in negotiations of False Claims Act matters and Corporate Integrity Agreements with the government.  
 **  Matthew H. Solomson is a Trial Attorney in the Commercial Litigation Branch of the United States 
Department of Justice, where he primarily litigates government contracts matters, including fraud claims under 
the False Claims Act, the Contract Disputes Act, and the forfeiture of fraudulent claims statute. He also serves as 
an Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, where he teaches a survey course on 
government contracts law. 
 ***  Mahnu V. Davar is an Associate in Arnold & Porter LLP’s FDA HealthCare group and has advised 
pharmaceutical company clients on a number of False Claims Act related matters. 
 ****  Kathleen H. Harne is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of Law. 
 1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. 
 2. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal 
Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 19, 2009) (available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2009/November/09-civ-1253.html). 
 3. Id. 
 4. The purposes of the 1986 amendments are beyond the scope of this article. For a description of these 
purposes, see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2, 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67, 5269. 
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In May 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) was 
signed into law.5 Unlike the 1986 amendments, FERA’s primary purpose is to 
overrule court decisions with which Congress disagreed. Indeed, section 4 of FERA, 
which contains the FCA revisions, is entitled “Clarifications to the False Claims Act 
to Reflect the Original Intent of the Law.”6 And the Senate Report accompanying 
the 2009 FCA amendments explained: 
 One of the most successful tools for combating waste and abuse in 
Government spending has been the . . . [FCA], which is an extraordinary 
civil enforcement tool used to recover funds lost to fraud and abuse. The 
effectiveness of the FCA has recently been undermined by court decisions 
limiting the scope of the law and allowing subcontractors and non-
governmental entities to escape responsibility for proven frauds. In order to 
respond to these decisions, certain provisions of the FCA must be corrected 
and clarified in order to protect the Federal assistance and relief funds 
expended in response to our current economic crisis. 
 This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous 
interpretations of the law that were decided in Allison Engine Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008), and United States ex. rel. 
Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).7 
This article analyzes the significant changes in the FCA effectuated by FERA, 
particularly with respect to court decisions that Congress sought to undo, and thus 
we presume the reader has a basic familiarity with the FCA’s structure and 
operation.8 
Accordingly, we first discuss the significant FCA changes related to liability 
under the statute, now contained in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Those changes primarily 

 5. Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C.); Posting of Jesse Lee to The White 
House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/protecting-homeowners-protecting-the-economy (May 20, 2009, 
18:49 EST) (providing a link to a video of the FERA-signing ceremony); see also American Health Lawyers 
Association, False Claims Act 2009—Redline Version, http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Teleconferences/ 
fca090617/Documents/FCA2009Amendments_Redline.pdf. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621. 
 7. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438; see also Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, supra note 2. 
 8. For more background on the False Claims Act, see AM. BAR ASS’N, QUI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT (Howard W. Cox & Peter B. Hutt II eds., 2d ed. 1999); Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims 
Act: Congress Giveth and the Courts Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373 (2002); Matthew H. Solomson & 
Sarah M. Brackney, What Would Scalia Do?—A Textualist Approach to the Qui Tam Settlement Provision of the 
False Claims Act, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 39 (2006); Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights 
and Roles of the Government and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357 (1998); 
Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government’s Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under the False 
Claims Act and the Government’s Right to Veto Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041 (1998); Valerie 
R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government: Which Is the Real Party to the 
Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1991); Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81. 
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deal with the meaning of (claim) presentment to the government, false statements 
and records, reverse false claims, and the delivery of property to the government. In 
the next section, we deal with the new definitions of the FCA’s key functional terms. 
Finally, in section four, we address the controversy surrounding the effective date of 
FERA’s FCA amendments and the issue of retroactivity. Given the government’s 
enforcement focus on health care and defense contractor fraud, we endeavor, where 
possible, to use specific examples and cases from those fields.9 
ii. fera’s significant alterations to the fca’s liability provisions 
As noted above, the Senate’s Report on FERA reflects the Senate’s deep 
disappointment with several prominent, relatively recent court decisions that 
limited the scope of the FCA.10 In particular, the Senate Report characterized the 
recent decisions in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders11 and United 
States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.12 as “erroneous interpretations of the law,” 
and described the recent judicial creation of what Congress believed were new FCA 
defenses and elements as “contrary to Congress’s original intent.”13 Overall, FERA 
enhances the government’s (or a relator’s) ability to establish “clear liability” for 
false or fraudulent claims submitted to contractors or federal grantees,14 to hold 
perpetrators of Medicare and Medicaid fraud accountable,15 and, in general, to 
expand liability to individuals or entities involved in the use or making of false or 
fraudulent claims to obtain federal government dollars.16 

 9. According to the Department of Justice, “[a] top priority for this administration is fighting health care 
fraud” and “[i]n fiscal year 2009, health care fraud recoveries reached $1.6 billion, two-thirds of the year’s 
total.” Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 2. Moreover, the Department states:   
The largest health care recoveries came from the pharmaceutical and medical device industries, 
which accounted for $866.7 million in settlements, including Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc., Bayer 
HealthCare LLC, Eli Lilly & Company and Quest Diagnostics Inc. and its subsidiary, Nichols 
Institute Diagnostics Inc. In addition to federal recoveries, these pharmaceutical and medical device 
fraud cases returned $402 million to state Medicaid programs.  
Id. (“Procurement fraud accounted for a quarter of fiscal year 2009 recoveries with $608.4 million in 
settlements and judgments, including $422 million attributable to Department of Defense contracts.”). 
 10. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4. 
 11. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).  
 12. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
 13. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10. 
 14. Christopher C. Burris, Michael E. Paulhus, & Louisa B. Childs, Converging Events Signal a Changing 
Landscape in False Claims Act and Whistle-Blower Litigation and Investigations, FED. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009,        
at 59, 60. 
 15. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 16. See infra Part II.A–C. 
SOLOMSON.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  4:56 PM 
 Congress Declares Checkmate 
298 journal of business & technology law 
A. Presentment to the Federal Government: FERA Legislatively Overrules Totten & 
Allison Engine 
Prior to FERA, courts in FCA cases closely scrutinized whether alleged false or 
fraudulent claims actually were presented to the federal government. As explained 
in more detail below, FERA eliminates any direct presentment requirement for FCA 
liability to attach.17 To put the revised presentment requirement in context, we first 
review the basic changes in statutory language,18 the influential cases of Totten and 
Allison Engine,19 and recent cases that illustrate how the absence of a direct 
presentment requirement may alter the outcome of FCA cases going forward.20 
1. Changes in Statutory Language: § 3729(a)(1) to § 3729(a)(1)(A) 
Under § 3729(a)(1) of the pre-FERA FCA, a defendant was liable when he 
“knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be presented, to an officer or employee of 
the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”21 In early FCA cases, 
plaintiffs were required to establish, among other things, that: (1) the defendant 
submitted false claims to an entity that constituted an instrumentality of the United 
States; and (2) the individual who received the claims was, in fact, an employee of 
that instrumentality.22 
For example, in 1958, in Rainwater v. United States,23 the Supreme Court 
adopted a multi-factor test in determining that the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) was a federal government instrumentality, and that the defendant’s direct 
submission of false claims to the instrumentality therefore satisfied the FCA’s 
presentment requirement.24 In so holding, the Court considered both that Congress 
had created the CCC and that the federal government generally had supervised the 
CCC.25 In addition, the Court found that congressional appropriations provided all 
of the CCC’s capital and that the corporation’s officers and personnel were federal 
employees.26 The Court considered the general purpose of the CCC, which was to 
provide an “administrative device . . . for the purpose of carrying out federal farm 
programs with public funds.”27 Finally, the Court noted that the CCC’s incorpor-

 17. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 20. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 21. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621. 
 22. See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 591 (1958). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 591–94.  
 25. Id. at 591. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 592.  
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ation statute expressly provided that the CCC is an “agency and instrumentality of 
the United States.”28 Given the totality of these factors, the FCA applied because the 
CCC was “wholly owned and closely controlled” by the federal government.29 
After FERA, the Rainwater analysis is no longer necessary. The new FCA 
amendment mandates liability for a defendant if it “knowingly presents, or causes 
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”30 FERA 
eliminates the requirement that the claim be presented directly to a government 
official or employee.31 Thus, courts may now hold a defendant liable whenever an 
alleged false or fraudulent claim is presented to any individual or entity in the chain 
of a transaction with the federal government, such as a federal contractor or 
grantee.32 As the Senate Report explains, FERA ensures that “direct presentment [to 
the United States government] is not required for liability to attach.”33 This change 
is perhaps the most significant expansion of the FCA’s scope resulting from FERA. 
2. Congress Targets Totten and Allison Engine 
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.34 and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders35 were Congress’s 
primary targets in its relaxation of the direct presentment requirement.36 
In Totten, the relator alleged that several contractors had delivered defective 
railway cars to Amtrak and therefore had submitted false invoices (i.e., claims) for 
payment to an Amtrak account via which federal funds would be used.37 Although 
the relator maintained that Amtrak had paid the defendants with federal funds, the 
relator did not allege that any claims were presented directly to a government 
official or employee.38 Because Amtrak was not “the Government,” the court found 
the FCA inapplicable and dismissed the complaint.39 The court rested its analysis on 
Amtrak’s organic statute, which provided that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, 

 28. Id. at 591 (quoting Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, Pub. L. No. 80-806, sec. 2, 62 Stat. 
1070, 1070 (1948) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. Id. at 594.  
 30. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2009).  
 31. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006) (including a requirement that a claim be presented directly to a 
government official or employee), with 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (eliminating the “to a government official 
or employee” language). 
 32. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 33. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 439. 
 34. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 35. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008). 
 36. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10. 
 37. 380 F.3d at 490. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 490–92.  
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or instrumentality of the United States Government.”40 The court concluded that 
this provision of the Amtrak statute distinguished Amtrak from the CCC at issue in 
Rainwater.41 
The court also rejected the relator’s argument that “a claim submitted to Amtrak 
is effectively a claim presented to the Government.”42 Instead, the court relied upon 
the FCA’s “clear textual requirement” of presentment to a United States official or 
employee43 to conclude that Congress had intended a direct presentment 
requirement.44 Similarly, the court rejected the relator’s argument that a direct 
presentment requirement was inconsistent with the definition of “claim” under       
§ 3729(c), which prior to FERA included payment requests to federal grantees “if 
the United States Government provides any portion of the money” requested.45 
According to the court, the two provisions were harmonious in providing for FCA 
liability under two conditions: (1) “if the Government provides the funds to the 
grantee upon presentment of a claim to the Government;” or (2) “if, after the grantee 
presents the claim, the Government provides the funds directly to the claimant.”46 
In general, Totten illustrates the dispositive role the presentment requirement 
often played in pre-FERA FCA cases.47 As in Totten, the Supreme Court in Allison 
Engine interpreted the presentment requirement based on a plain reading of the 
statutory language, and further confirmed that an FCA defendant must have 
presented a claim directly to the federal government for FCA liability to attach 
under § 3729(a)(1).48 

 40. Id. at 491 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 24301 (a)(3) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 41. Id. at 492 (noting that Rainwater is “clearly distinguishable” because the statute in that case “expressly 
provided” that the CCC was an agency of the United States government). 
 42. Id.   
 43. Id.  
 44. See id. at 495–96 (noting that Congress did not amend subsection (a)(1) in 1986 although it could have 
done so and removed the language requiring claims be presented to a government officer or employee). 
 45. Id. at 492–93 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. Id. at 493; see also id. at 496 (warning that an “effective” presentment interpretation would “make the 
potential reach of the Act almost boundless”). For example, the court noted that under an effective presentment 
interpretation, liability attaches “for any false claim made to any college or university, so long as the institution 
has received some federal grants—as most of them do.” Id. at 496. The court further held that under                   
§ 3729(a)(2), regarding false records and statements, direct presentment to the federal government also was 
mandatory. See id. at 498–99. However, the Supreme Court overruled this interpretation in Allison Engine Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2129–30 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., 380 F.3d at 493.  
 48. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2129. In dicta, however, the Court noted that under § 3729(a)(1), liability 
may be established when a claim is presented to “a contractor, grantee, or other recipient of federal funds and 
then forwarded to the Government.” Id. at 2129 n.1. The Court explained that, unlike § 3729(a)(1), 
presentment is unnecessary under § 3729(a)(2), the section dealing with false records and statements. Id. at 
2129. The Court reasoned that Congress’s use of the word “presentment” in subsection (a)(1), and its failure to 
use that term in (a)(2), showed that Congress intended only to make presentment a requirement for a claim 
under (a)(1). Id. at 2129–30; see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 
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FERA’s revision to the FCA’s presentment language effectively pulls the plug on 
a series of FCA decisions mirroring Allison Engine and Totten.49 Indeed, had FERA’s 
presentment provision applied to the facts at issue in Totten, the FCA would have 
applied because presentment of invoices to Amtrak, a federal grantee, would satisfy 
the new FCA § 3729(a)(1)(A).50 
3. Recent Cases Reflect How FERA May Alter the Balance of Power in FCA Litigation 
in Favor of the Government and Relators 
A number of recent FCA cases reflect not only the continuing evolution of the 
presentment requirement, but also, more importantly, how FERA would affect the 
outcome of those decisions and expand the reach of the FCA. In particular, FERA’s 
elimination of the FCA’s direct presentment requirement likely would permit a 
wider range of viable FCA suits than the pre-FERA version of the statute. 
For example, in a 2008 decision in United States ex rel. Sterling v. Health 
Insurance Plan of Greater New York, Inc.,51 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York considered whether the FCA’s presentment 
requirement was satisfied where Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP), 
a federal government contractor, submitted falsified data to the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), HIP’s accrediting agency, in order to 
obtain accreditation vital for obtaining federal contracts with Medicaid and 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).52 The relator alleged that the 
government’s reliance upon the fraudulently acquired accreditation derived from 
HIP’s falsified data.53 
Because presentment to NCQA was not presentment to the government for the 
purposes of the FCA, the court dismissed the FCA action under § 3729(a)(1).54 
Citing Allison Engine, the court noted that, while the outcome may have been 
different if the claim was subsequently forwarded to the United States, the absence 
of government involvement was dispositive.55 The district court dismissed the          

(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Similarly, the 
Court found that presentment was unnecessary under § 3729(a)(3), which imposed liability on any one who 
“‘conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid,’” given the 
absence of specific presentment language as contained in subsection (a)(1). Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130 
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3)). 
 49. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. 
 50. See Totten, 380 F.3d at 496 (noting that Congress could have amended subsection (a)(1) “to provide 
that claims be presented to the Government or a grantee or recipient of Government funds. But Congress did 
not touch (a)(1) at all . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 51. No. 06 Civ. 1141, 2008 WL 4449448, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 52. Id. at *1–*2. 
 53. Id. at *2. 
 54. Id. at *6. 
 55. Id. The court emphasized that NCQA was not “funded by, in contract with, or related to the 
Government in any way.” Id. 
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§ 3729(a)(1) claim because the relator failed to “establish presentment of the false 
claim to the Government.”56 
Because the FCA no longer requires presentment directly to the government or 
one of its agents, the outcome of the relator’s § 3729(a)(1) claim post-FERA would 
not have turned on the presentment issue. Instead, because NCQA is an 
independent entity, and is not a federal grantee, contractor, or recipient of federal 
funds (something that remains necessary under FERA’s definition of a “claim”), the 
relator’s allegations may not have passed muster57 for the separate reason that there 
was no FCA claim.58 
Similarly, in United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC,59 the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that false claims submitted by Custer Battles, an 
international security company, to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a 
temporary administrative entity created to govern Iraq and staffed by both United 
States and coalition country personnel,60 satisfied the presentment requirement 
under § 3729(a)(1).61 The court explained that because United States government 
officials were acting in their official capacity, albeit for the CPA, Custer Battles had 
presented the claims for payment to government officials.62 Although this case did 
not address the then-applicable Rainwater instrumentality test, Custer Battles likely 
remains sound law post-FERA because, even if the CPA were simply a grantee or 
recipient of federal funds—as opposed to an instrumentality of the United States—
the FCA’s presentment requirement would be satisfied.63 

 56. Id.  
 57. But see United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (“If a false 
statement is integral to a causal chain leading to payment, it is irrelevant how the federal bureaucracy has 
apportioned the statements among layers of paperwork.”); United States v. Chapman Univ., No. SACV 04-
1256JVSRCX, 2006 WL 1562231, *2–*3 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2006). 
In this case, phase-one is Chapman’s submission of documents for accreditation by WASC. Phase-
two is Chapman’s submission of documents for specific state and federal loans and grants, which 
depend on Chapman’s accreditation by WASC. Therefore, Relators assert that but for the alleged 
false statements contained in phase-one, Chapman would not have been granted certain loans and 
grants. No more is required to state a claim under the FCA or CFCA at this point in the 
proceedings. 
Id. 
 58. Under the amended FCA, the term “claim” means: 
[A]ny request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property . . . that— 
(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a contractor, 
grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s 
behalf or to advance a Government program or interest . . . . 
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (West 2009). 
 59. 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 60. Id. at 297.  
 61. Id. at 307. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (West 2009). 
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Finally, in the May 2009 case of United States Department of Transportation ex 
rel. Arnold v. CMC Engineering,64 relators alleged that CMC Engineering, 
consultants who provide services to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation (PennDOT), falsified credentials to “obtain overpayments for 
engineering, inspection, and consultant services on federally-funded highway 
projects administered by PennDOT.”65 The district court concluded that submitting 
claims to state agencies, such as PennDOT, did not satisfy the presentment 
requirement under § 3729(a)(1), because none of the claims had been presented to, 
or approved by, the federal government.66 In light of Allison Engine, however, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case, 
emphasizing that, if the federal government was involved in disbursing funds from 
PennDOT to CMC Engineering upon submission of its claims, then the FCA indeed 
may apply.67 
B. False Statements and Records: The Elimination of Allison Engine’s Intent 
Requirement 
Prior to FERA’s enactment, liability existed under § 3729(a)(2) of the FCA if an 
individual or entity “knowingly ma[de], use[d], or cause[d] to be made or used, a 
false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government.”68 FERA expands this section—and renumbers the provision to 
§ 3729 (a)(1)(B)—by attaching liability to anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim.”69 In so doing, FERA removes the prior statutory requirements, as 
interpreted in Allison Engine, of intent to influence the government’s payment 
decision and that the government must play some role in paying or approving the 
claims.70 Additionally, the new amendment adopts Allison Engine’s “material” 
requirement, defining it as “having a natural tendency to influence, or being 
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”71 
1. Allison Engine’s Intent Requirement 
In Allison Engine, the Supreme Court considered whether the FCA applied to a 
subcontractor that had submitted fraudulent invoices to two shipbuilders who were 

 64. 564 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 65. Id. at 675. 
 66. Id. at 676. 
 67. Id. at 679. 
 68. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006). 
 69. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2009). 
 70. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438–39. 
 71. Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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parties to a contract with the Navy.72 The Court examined whether the plaintiff had 
stated an FCA claim under § 3729(a)(2) where the Navy already had disbursed 
government funds in advance to the shipbuilders without any additional federal 
involvement.73 The Court unanimously concluded that a proper FCA claim did not 
exist merely where “the false statement’s use . . . resulted in obtaining or getting 
payment or approval of the claim, or that government money was used to pay the 
false or fraudulent claim.”74 Rather, the relator “must prove that the defendant 
intended that the false record or statement be material to the Government’s 
decision to pay or approve the false claim.”75 The Court focused on the phrases “to 
get” and “paid or approved by the Government” within § 3729(a)(2)76 and 
concluded that a defendant must have an actual purpose, or “must intend that the 
Government itself pay the claim.”77 Echoing prior cases, including Rainwater and 
Totten, the Court reasoned that failing to impose some “intent” requirement would 
render § 3729(a)(2) “almost boundless.”78 
The Court also held that proof of intent did not require presentment of a claim 
to the federal government.79 Thus, the Court clarified that a violation of 
§ 3729(a)(2) exists when “the subcontractor submits a false statement to the prime 
contractor intending for the statement to be used by the prime contractor to get the 
Government to pay its claim.”80 However, the Court distinguished that 
circumstance from one in which a subcontractor made a fraudulent statement to a 
private entity, but did not intend for the government to rely on the false statement 
to induce payment; in the latter case, no liability would attach under § 3729(a)(2).81 
In sum, absent an intent requirement, the Court reasoned that the link between 
the false statement and the government’s decision to pay the claim would be “too 
attenuated,” and would “threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose anti-
fraud statute.”82 

 72. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2126–27 (2008).  
 73. Id. at 2126–28.  
 74. Id. at 2126 (quoting United States ex rel. v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 621–22 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Prior to FERA, the statute provided that liability incurs when any person “knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-21, sec. 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1622. 
 77. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2128.  
 78. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 79. Id. at 2129. 
 80. Id. at 2130. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
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2. Material Changes 
To succeed on a § 3729(a)(2) claim after Allison Engine, an FCA plaintiff had to 
establish that: (1) the defendant intended, or had the purpose of, getting the false 
claim approved or paid by the federal government; and (2) the defendant’s false 
statement or record was material to the government’s decision to approve or pay 
the claim.83 Prior to FERA, however, the FCA did not define “material.”84 Instead, 
case law had adopted a variety of definitions of the term, and some cases even 
questioned whether the FCA contained a “material” requirement altogether.85 Two 
tests for “material” ultimately emerged: (1) a broader standard, employed by most 
courts, defining “material” as a claim “capable of influencing” or having “a natural 
tendency to influence” the federal government’s decision to pay the claim; and (2) 
the “material outcome” test—whether the federal government “actually relied on 
the information.”86 
FERA codified the broader definition of “material,” that is: “having a natural 
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property.”87 FERA’s “material” standard may open the door to additional 
FCA cases as plaintiffs now need only demonstrate that an alleged false claim “could 
have influenced” the government in its decision to pay the claim, rather than 
showing that it did in fact influence a government decision to pay the claim.88 
3. Recent Cases and Potential Revised Interpretations 
Even courts that continue to apply pre-FERA case law acknowledge that FERA has 
significantly altered the interpretive landscape with respect to FCA liability 
standards for false records and statements. Cases applying the pre-FERA FCA 
remain noteworthy because they illustrate the type of intent requirement with 
which FERA has dispensed. In particular, courts deciding FCA cases involving 
Medicare or Medicaid often reach differing results depending upon the court’s view 
of the “material” requirement. In this section, we review a number of recent such 
cases that illustrate how the contours of the false records and statements liability 
component of the FCA may take shape under FERA. 

 83. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 505 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 84. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)–(c) (2006) (defining terms such as “knowing,” “knowingly,” and “claim” 
but neither mentioning nor defining “material”), with 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4) (West 2009) (“[T]he term 
‘material’ means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property.”). 
 85. Burris et al., supra note 14, at 61. 
 86. Id.  
 87. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4); see infra Part II.E. (discussing reverse false claim liability). 
 88. See Burris et al., supra note 14, at 61.  
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For example, in United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care of the Florida Keys, Inc. v. 
Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC,89 the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts considered whether the defendant could be held liable pursuant to   
§ 3729(a)(2) for reporting inflated prices for drugs, thereby causing the state 
Medicaid program to pay substantially more for those drugs than was necessary.90 
Although the court issued its opinion in October 2009, post-FERA, the court 
nonetheless relied upon Allison Engine in concluding that the defendant could be 
held liable under § 3729(a)(2).91 The court reasoned that there was a direct link 
between the claim and the federal government because “each claim submitted to 
Medicaid leads directly to a federal outlay . . . .”92 Because the “natural 
consequence” was for the alleged false claim to reach the federal government, the 
court found that the defendant intended to defraud the government.93 Moreover, 
the court determined that it was apparent the claims were “material” because 
inflating prices had a “natural tendency” to influence the government’s decision to 
pay an inflated amount.94 Under FERA (i.e., even absent any intent requirement), 
the result in this case would not have differed because the “material” analysis would 
have sufficed.95 
Conversely, in the 2009 case of United States v. Aguillon,96 the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware also relied upon pre-FERA case law, yet 
reached the opposite result from that in Actavis Mid-Atlantic LLC. In Aguillon, the 
court considered whether a doctor violated § 3729(a)(2) when he billed medical 
services at an unnecessarily exorbitant rate as well as services that he failed to 
actually perform to a private Medicare contractor.97 Dismissing the relator’s claim 
under § 3729(a)(2), the court noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, “a plaintiff 
must also show that the defendant made or used (or caused someone else to make 
or use) a false record in order to cause the false claim to be actually paid or 
approved.”98 Because the defendant-doctor’s payment requests regarding Medicare 
patients were not actually false at the time they were paid—and because the 
remaining false claims were “subsequently denied prior to payment”—no “false 
claims were actually paid or approved.”99 Although the court declined to apply the 
FERA amendments retroactively, the court commented that, because the term 

 89. 659 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 90. Id. at 264–65. 
 91. Id. at 270–71. 
 92. Id. at 270. 
 93. Id. at 270–71. 
 94. Id. at 271. 
 95. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2009). 
 96. 628 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Del. 2009). 
 97. Id. at 543–46. 
 98. Id. at 549 (emphasis added) (quoting United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 242 
(3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 99. Id.  
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“material” requires only that the false record be “capable of influencing[] the 
payment or receipt of money,” new § 3729(a)(1)(B) permits imposition of civil 
penalties without proof that the false claims were actually paid or approved.100 
On the other hand, in another health care case decided prior to the passage of 
FERA, United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,101 the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
trial court’s dismissal of an FCA claim under § 3729(a)(2) against doctors who 
made false records regarding Medicare and Medicaid services that they failed to 
actually provide.102 Relying on Allison Engine, the court reasoned that “the recording 
of a false record, when it is made with the requisite intent, is enough to satisfy the 
statute” and that it was unnecessary to “infe[r] that the record actually caused a 
claim to be presented to the Government.”103 Thus, because the doctors routinely 
falsified doctor visits with patients, it was irrelevant that they never directly 
presented these claims to the government in order to state a proper § 3729(a)(2) 
claim.104 
Under FERA, however, courts will no longer need to evaluate Allison’s intent 
issue, but rather the government or a relator now need only allege facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that a defendant’s false record or statement was capable of influencing 
the payment or receipt of money.105 
For example, in United States ex. rel. Sterling v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater 
New York, Inc.,106 the district court considered whether the defendant, the Health 
Insurance Plan of Greater New York, Inc. (“HIP”) violated § 3729(a)(2) when it 
submitted falsified data to the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(“NCQA”), HIP’s accrediting agency, in order to obtain accreditation necessary for 
receiving federal contracts with Medicaid and CHIP.107 The court concluded that the 
complaint’s count under § 3729(a)(2) should be dismissed because the complaint 
failed to allege that HIP intended to defraud the federal government.108 According to 
the court, the alleged falsification only supported an intent to deceive NCQA, not 
the government, and therefore did not satisfy Allison Engine’s requirement of 
establishing a “direct link” between the false statement and the government’s 

 100. Id. at 549 & n.11 (quoting 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4)). Conversely, under § 3729(a)(1), the court 
sustained the claim because according to settled law in the Third Circuit, a claim does not need to be actually 
paid for (a)(1) liability. Id. at 548 (citing United States v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 
430, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2004)). 
 101. 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 102. Id. at 183, 192, 194. 
 103. Id. at 192–93 & n.37. 
 104. Id. at 193.  
 105. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
 106. No. 06 Civ. 1141, 2008 WL 4449448, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008). See supra Part II.A. for the 
presentment analysis in this case. 
 107. Sterling, 2008 WL 4449448, at *1–*2. 
 108. Id. at *5. 
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decision to make payment.109 If this case had been decided under FERA, however, 
the plaintiff would have had a stronger case for § 3729(a)(2) liability so long as the 
falsified data, and the consequential accreditation, was material to the federal 
government’s decision to contract with HIP (i.e., removing the necessity of alleging 
facts that demonstrate any specific intent).110 
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Thomas v. Bailey,111 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas concluded that a sham consulting 
agreement between one of the doctor-defendants and a medical supply company to 
compensate the doctor for using the company’s products was insufficient to 
support a claim of liability under § 3729(a)(2).112 Although the hospital purchased 
the instruments for use by the doctor and then requested reimbursement from 
various federal health programs for the services performed, which typically included 
the cost of the instruments used, the court dismissed the complaint because it failed 
to allege that the agreement “was made or used to get a false claim paid.”113 
However, if this case had been decided under FERA, the sham consulting agreement 
may have resulted in FCA liability since the defendant’s agreement may have been 
deemed material to the hospital that purchased the medical instruments for use by 
the doctor and then submitted reimbursement claims.114 In other words, under 
FERA, the defendant’s intent, or lack thereof, to get the government to pay the false 
claim paid would have been irrelevant.115 
Finally, in United States v. Hawley,116 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Iowa, Western Division, considered whether a private 
insurance company violated § 3729(a)(2) when it aided unqualified farmers in 
making falsified claims against Multi-Peril Crop Insurance Policies (MPCI) that 
were “sold by Hawley, issued by North Central Crop Insurance (NCCI), and 
reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).”117 Despite the 
allegation that Hawley had made at least one false MCPI crop insurance application 
or false acreage report, the court sua sponte granted summary judgment for the 

 109. Id. The court dismissed the link identified by the relator, who alleged:  
[T]hat HIP had a contractual requirement to maintain accreditation, that the . . . statistics would 
have affected its accreditation, that HIP therefore falsified the results that it gave to NCQA to 
maintain good ratings, and then, finally, that the Government relied on this fraudulently obtained 
positive NCQA rating to award HIP continuing contracts. 
Id. 
 110. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
 111. No. 4:06CV00465, 2008 WL 4853630, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2008). 
 112. Id. at *1–*3, *15. 
 113. Id.(quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006)). See generally 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI 
TAM ACTIONS § 2.01[B] (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010) (explaining direct false claims liability after FERA). 
 114. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B).  
 115. See id.  
 116. 566 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Iowa 2008).  
 117. Id. at 920. 
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defendant118 because Hawley did not possess the requisite pre-FERA intent.119 While 
the claims were paid with federal government funds, the government never 
subsequently paid any of the claims itself; rather, the government “only reimbursed 
NCCI pursuant to the Standard Reinsurance Agreement for claims that NCCI had 
paid [and] . . . did not pay any claims itself.”120 Because the claims were never 
subsequently forwarded to the government for approval, liability under (a)(2) did 
not attach.121 Once again, a court found insufficient the plaintiff’s allegation that a 
defendant intended for a non-government entity to approve or pay the claim at 
issue.122 
Under FERA, however, this decision likely would have been different. Not only 
has FERA legislatively invalidated Allison Engine’s intent requirement, but also 
FERA’s definition of a “claim”—money the government has provided, provides, or 
will provide—now attaches liability because government funds were at some point 
involved in Hawley’s conduct.123 
C. Conspiracy: § 3729(a)(3) to § 3729(a)(1)(C) 
Prior to FERA, an individual could be held liable for conspiracy under § 3729(a)(3) 
of the FCA if he or she “conspire[d] to defraud the Government by getting a false or 
fraudulent claim allowed or paid.”124 Under the new FERA amendments, an 
individual is liable if he or she “conspires to commit a violation” of any substantive 
section of the FCA, such as presentment, false records or statements, or reverse false 
claims.125 Moreover, FERA eliminates Allison Engine’s requirement that the 
conspirator intended to defraud the government.126 
Similar to the other new FCA provisions, the new statutory language regarding 
conspiracy counters judicial interpretations of “intent” under Allison Engine, and 
may lead to reversed decisions if courts apply FERA retroactively. For example, in 
United States ex rel. Thomas v. Bailey,127 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed a conspiracy claim under § 3729(a)(3) in 

 118. Id. at 922–23. 
 119. Id. at 926–27. 
 120. Id. at 927.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. Senator Grassley, introducing the False Claims Act Clarification Act of 2009 three weeks after FERA, 
stated that Hawley was an example of Allison Engine making it “virtually impossible to prove [FCA liability] 
where [a] subcontractor knowingly ripped off the taxpayers.” Kevin M. Comeau, Comment, False Certification 
Claims in Light of Allison Engine and False Claims Act Amendments Introduced in the 111th Congress, 18 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 491, 510–11 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting 155 CONG. REC. S2425 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley)). 
 123. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B), (b)(2) (West 2009). 
 124. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2006).  
 125. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(C). 
 126. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 439–40. 
 127. No. 4:06CV00465, 2008 WL 4853630, at *1–*2, *15 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 06, 2008). 
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which a doctor and other defendants, including a medical instrument company, 
allegedly entered into a sham consulting agreement whereby the doctor would be 
compensated for using the company’s instruments.128 Although the complaint 
alleged that the defendants were aware that their conduct would result in the doctor 
submitting false claims to the government, the court reasoned the complaint failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the complaint did not 
allege that the defendants’ conspiracy was specifically intended to defraud the 
government.129 Had this case been decided under the FERA regime, however, the 
district court would not have dismissed the conspiracy claim, as intent is no longer 
a required element of such a claim.130 
Beyond the area of “intent,” the Senate Report on FERA noted that the new FCA 
amendments specifically targeted court decisions that narrowly interpreted the 
conspiracy provision.131 In particular, FERA extends conspiracy to individuals who 
conspired in the making or using of reverse false claims under § 3729(a)(7).132 
Under § 3729(a)(7), a defendant was liable for reverse false claims when he 
“conceal[ed], avoid[ed], or decrease[d] an obligation to pay or transmit money or 
property to the Government.”133 In United States ex rel. Huangyan Import & Export 
Corp. v. Nature’s Farm Products, Inc.,134 for example, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California considered whether liability under      
§ 3729(a)(3) could attach to Nature’s Farm Products, Inc. (NFP), a company that 
allegedly “conspired to and did evade customs duties on their imports by falsifying 
their products’ country of origin.”135 Although the court sustained plaintiff’s claim 
under § 3729(a)(7),136 it dismissed plaintiff’s § 3729(a)(3) claim, reasoning that 
“[b]y its express terms, § 3729(a)(3) does not reach conspiracies to make reverse 
false claims.”137 
Tracking the statutory language of subsection (a)(3), which requires “getting a 
false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid,” the court reasoned that the defendants 
only wanted to avoid paying the duties, and did not seek the government’s payment 
of their claim.138 The court further dismissed the argument that the FCA’s definition 
of a claim under § 3729(c) would mean that the conspiracy provision extended to 
reverse false claims, since the definition only expands claims made to United States 

 128. Id. at *1–*2, *15.  
 129. Id. at *15.  
 130. See supra Part II.B. 
 131. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12–13. 
 132. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(C) (West 2009). 
 133. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006). See infra Part II.E for an expanded discussion of FERA’s changes to 
reverse false claims. 
 134. 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 994, 996.  
 136. Id. at 995–96.  
 137. Id. at 1002–03.  
 138. Id. at 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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agents or intermediaries.139 This case is but one clear example of a judicial decision 
that FERA intended to supersede by extending conspiracy liability to reverse false 
claims without requiring the defendants to get the government to pay or approve 
the claim. 
D. Delivery of Property: § 3729(a)(4) to § 3729(a)(1)(D) 
FERA provides a new source of liability where an individual “has possession, 
custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government 
and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or 
property . . . .”140 The new provision eliminates pre-FERA language requiring an 
intent to defraud, willful concealment, and out-dated requirements for receipts or 
certificates.141 Eliminating the old section’s “intending to defraud” and “willfully to 
conceal” language also is consistent with FERA’s other changes discussed above 
(e.g., to §§ 3729(a)(1)(B) and (C)).142 
E. The Expansion of the Reverse False Claims Provision: § 3729(a)(7) to 
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) 
The 1986 so-called reverse false claims provision created liability for a person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to 
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to 
the Government.”143 FERA revises this provision to impose liability in two distinct 
scenarios: where a person either (1) “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government”; or (2) “knowingly conceals or knowingly 
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or 

 139. Id.  
 140. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(D) (West 2009). The previous version of the statute provided liability for any 
person who “has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government 
and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be 
delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt.” 31 U.S.C.            
§ 3729(a)(4) (2006).  
 141. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 13 (2009), as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441 (“[B]ecause this section has 
remained unchanged from the original act that was drafted in 1863, the archaic language has made recoveries 
under a conversion theory contingent upon the individual receiving an actual receipt for the property.”); see 
also United States ex rel. Aakhus v. Dyncorp., Inc., 136 F.3d 676, 680 n.3, 681 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding no 
violation of § 3729(a)(4) where defendant did not receive a certificate or receipt). 
 142. See supra Parts II.B.3, II.C. 
 143. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). “The forbidden conduct ‘is called a reverse false claim because the action of the 
defendant results not in improper payment to the defendant from the Government, but rather no payment to 
the Government when payment is otherwise obligated.’” United States ex rel. Branch Consultants, LLC v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-4091, 2009 WL 3353314, at *27 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2009) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
SOLOMSON.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  4:56 PM 
 Congress Declares Checkmate 
312 journal of business & technology law 
property to the Government.”144 Thus, FERA’s amendment to the reverse false 
claims provision has altered its scope in a number of important ways. 
First, although the first clause of the new provision now contains a “material” 
requirement, that clause no longer requires that a person conceal, avoid, or decrease 
an obligation to pay money to the government, but rather only that the false 
statement be material to an obligation to pay money to the government. 
Second, and more significantly, the provision no longer requires a person to 
make a false statement to trigger liability, but only requires that a person know that 
he or she owes money to the government which has not been paid or returned. That 
second part of the post-FERA reverse false claims provision accordingly works in 
conjunction with the statute’s new definition of “obligation”—discussed in more 
detail below, and which includes the retention of an overpayment—to impose 
liability where a person has received federal money to which he or she either is not 
entitled or not entitled to retain (even if initially lawfully received).145 The creation 
or use of a false statement or record is not required. Only time will tell how far-
reaching this new reverse false claims provision will prove to be in terms of 
imposing FCA liability where the pre-FERA statute would not have done so. 
iii. definition changes 
As noted, Congress sought in FERA to “clarify” the intent of the 1986 FCA 
amendments by overturning several notable cases and making changes to the 
definitions sections. We address three key definitional changes that will have an 
important effect on the outcome of FCA litigation in the post-FERA world. First, 
FERA expands the definition of a “claim” under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) and, in 
doing so, the ambit of the FCA. Second, FERA explicitly adopts an expansive 
definition of “material.” Third, Congress altered the definition of “obligation” to 

 144. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 145. In contrast, see United States ex rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685–86 (W.D. 
Tex. 2008) (discussing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) and “find[ing] that for claims where Caremark applied a 
restriction to deny a state Medicaid request for reimbursement, and the restriction actually existed in the 
corresponding plan, the Government cannot establish that Caremark made a ‘false record or statement’ and 
FCA liability does not apply”). The district court in Allstate also explained that “[a] claim under                           
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) requires (1) that the defendant had an obligation to pay money to the government, (2) that the 
defendant used a false statement to avoid or decrease that obligation, (3) that the false statement was material, 
and (4) that the defendant made the false statement knowingly.” 2009 WL 3353314, at *27. But that decision’s 
explanation of the new provision relies on Caremark, which, in turn, dealt with the pre-FERA version of the 
statute. See Caremark, 586 F. Supp. 2d., at 668 (decided in 2008). As we explained above, however, the new 
reverse false claims provision does not require a “false record or statement” under the second clause of that 
provision. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 13–15 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 441–42. But see Little v. 
ENI Petroleum Co., No. CIV-06-120-M, 2009 WL 2424215, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 31, 2009) (“[I]n order to 
establish defendants’ liability for the alleged reverse false claims [under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G)], Little must 
show that . . . defendants made or used statements in order to avoid or decrease their obligation to pay money 
to the government.”). 
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make it consistent with the government’s long-held view of the meaning of that 
term. 
A. “Claim” 
Consistent with its intent to broaden the applicability of the FCA, Congress 
changed the definition of “claim” to overturn the district court’s holding in Custer 
Battles.146 As alluded to earlier, in the Custer Battles case, the court set aside a jury 
award finding that Iraqi funds administered by the United States government on 
behalf of the Iraqi people were not United States government funds within the 
scope of the FCA.147 FERA now expands the definition of “claim” expressly to 
include requests or demands for money or property that “is made to a contractor, 
grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the 
Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.”148 
The broad phrases “spent or used on the Government’s behalf” and “to advance 
a Government program or interest” are not defined, but it is clear that they have the 
potential to sweep in a new class of potential defendants under the ambit of the 
FCA. The full scope of this change will require resolution by the courts. The 
legislative history may be helpful in gleaning Congress’s intent. For example, 
Senator Jon Kyl stated that, in order to implicate the FCA post-FERA, a claim must 
be “predominantly federal in character.”149 At least one commentator has taken the 
view that the expansion of the definition of “claim,” coupled with the removal of 
the “presentment clause,” underlines the concern cited by the Supreme Court in 
Allison Engine that the FCA could create “boundless” liability and become an “all-
purpose antifraud statute.”150 

 146. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12-13. For a discussion of Custer Battles, see supra notes 59–63 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 148. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2009) (emphasis added). The new definition of “claim” also 
clarifies that the FCA applies even where the government “has provided” funds to a grantee—that is, upfront—
and the grantee is then subsequently defrauded by the defendant; accordingly, FERA makes the timing of 
federal funding to a granting irrelevant to the question of FCA liability. Id. 
 149. 155 CONG. REC. S4540 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Senator Kyl’s approach is 
reminiscent of the view of some pre-FERA courts, particularly in the context of health care fraud. See, e.g., 
United States v. Cathedral Rock Corp., No. 4:03CV1090 HEA, 2007 WL 4270784, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 
2007) (finding that the government’s “substantial role” in “funding and enforcement” of Medicaid and 
Medicare programs has led several courts to conclude that claims submitted to these entities are within the 
scope of the FCA).  
 150. See generally Beth C. McClain, Health Care Fraud Enforcement Developments, in THE IMPACT OF RECENT 
HEALTH CARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING CHANGES, OVERCOMING CHALLENGES, 
AND ADVISING CLIENTS IN A NEW LEGAL ENVIRONMENT (2009). 
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B. “Material” 
FERA also amends the FCA to include a definition of “material.” Under FERA, 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) now provides that liability under the FCA may attach where 
a defendant “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”151 Section 3729(b)(4) now defines 
“material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing 
the payment or receipt of money or property.”152 As explained above, prior to FERA, 
the concept of “material” was a central focus of health care fraud cases because 
courts found that a regulatory violation alone did not give rise to FCA liability 
under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) & (a)(2) unless a plaintiff could show that the 
violation was a “material” falsehood.153 To meet these requirements, plaintiffs 
successfully argued, for example, that a defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer’s 
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) or the Federal 
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) were falsehoods which materially misled the 
government to cover claims for reimbursement under Medicaid or Medicare.154 
Further, some plaintiffs advanced the theory of implied certification, arging that 
where the government would not pay funds to a party if it knew of a violation of 
law or regulation, merely submitting a claim for payment violates the FCA because 
the party fraudulently implied certification with the law or regulation.155 
Now that Congress has settled the debate about how “material” should be 
defined, plaintiffs in the pharmaceutical and health care industries likely will 
continue to point to regulatory or statutory violations as the basis of FCA cases. 

 151. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 152. Id. § 3729(b)(4). The Senate Report states that this definition of “material” comes from a long line of 
cases including United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008), which found that a material falsehood 
existed where a defendant’s kickback payments and Stark Law violations were a factor in the submission of false 
claims. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 & n.6 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 439 n.6. This definition was 
also apparently one endorsed by the Justice Department and consistent with a plaintiff-friendly view of the 
statute. See McClain¸ supra note 150, at *5. 
 153. See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 
147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 51 (D. Mass. 2001) (“It is true that the FCA cannot be used to enforce compliance with 
every federal law or regulation. . . . Nonetheless, the FCA can be used to create liability where failure to abide by 
a rule or regulation amounts to a material misrepresentations [sic] made to obtain government benefit.” 
(second emphasis added)); United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., No. 4:05CV570MLM, 2006 WL 
1064127, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006) (finding no FCA liability for a defendant’s promotion of an off-label 
drug use because the Medicare claim form did not require the doctor to distinguish between the approved use 
and the off-label use and thus the “fraud” in the Medicare reimbursement claim was not material to the 
approval for reimbursement). 
 154. See, e.g., Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 51–52 (noting that a pharmaceutical manufacturer could be 
liable for an FCA violation for promoting off-label drugs if it knowingly made a false statement to get a false 
claim paid or approved); id. at 53–55 (noting that FCA liability could attach if a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
violates the antikickback provision and it previously expressly or impliedly certified compliance with the 
antikickback provision in order to receive government funds).  
 155. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Foster v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823 (E.D. Tex. 
2008) (describing the theory of implied certification). 
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Thus, while the “material” requirement is another hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome, 
the broad definition of “material” and the relative familiarity of the concept in 
health care fraud cases suggest that it will not impede enforcement in this area. 
C. “Obligation” 
FERA now defines an “obligation” as “an established duty, whether or not fixed, 
arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee 
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or 
from the retention of any overpayment.”156 The meaning of this term often will arise 
in the reverse false claims context, where, for example, the government or relator 
alleges that a defendant has failed to repay an overpayment.157 
The new definition makes clear that, to be actionable under the FCA, an 
obligation need not be “fixed.” Accordingly, the FERA definition overruled cases 
that previously held that a duty to pay the government must be entirely fixed for 
liability to attach under the FCA.158 
While the new definition leaves some room for defendants to argue that a duty 
to return an overpayment must arise from an affirmative statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirement, there is authority for the proposition that an entity may 
not retain an otherwise improper payment.159 
iv. retroactivity 
As discussed, the purpose of FERA was to overrule prior court decisions in Allison 
Engine and Totten.160 A question has emerged as to the appropriate effective date for 
many of the key FERA changes. This issue may arise in one of two contexts. First, 
plaintiffs may seek to apply definitional changes from FERA to cases that predated 
FERA’s enactment. Second, plaintiffs may seek to use FERA changes as evidence of 

 156. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(3) (West 2009). 
 157. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 15 (“The new definition of ‘obligation’ includes an express statement than an 
obligation under the FCA includes ‘the retention of an overpayment.’ The Department of Justice supported the 
inclusion of this provision and provided technical advice that the proper place to include overpayments was in 
the definition of obligation.”). There appears to be no distinction between whether funds were improperly paid 
by the government to (and then retained by) a defendant or whether the government funds were legitimately 
initially received by the defendant but then were required to be returned. 
 158. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); Am. Textile Mfrs. 
Inst., Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 1999) (“To recover under the False Claims Act . . . the 
United States must demonstrate that it was owed a specific, legal obligation at the time that the alleged false 
record or statement was made, used, or caused to be made or used. The obligation cannot be merely a potential 
liability . . . .” (quoting United States v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc., 131 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1997))). 
 159. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 268, 270 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (“[W]hen a payment 
is erroneously or illegally made it is in direct violation of . . . the Constitution. Under these circumstances[,] it is 
. . . the duty of the Government to sue for a refund thereof, and no statute is necessary to authorize the United 
States to sue in such a case.” (citation omitted)). 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
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how ambiguous terms should be interpreted in pre-FERA cases. Each of these issues 
is discussed in turn. 
One of the principal changes enacted in FERA relates to pleading standards for 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) claims. Prior to FERA, this provision applied where a person 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to 
get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the [federal] Government.”161 In 
Allison Engine, the Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean that the false 
or fraudulent statement was material to the government’s payment decision: 
Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals below, we hold that it is 
insufficient for a plaintiff . . . to show merely that ‘the false statement’s use   
. . . result[ed] in obtaining or getting payment or approval of the claim,’ . . . 
or that ‘government money was used to pay the false or fraudulent claim.’    
. . . Instead, a plaintiff . . . must prove that the defendant intended that the 
false record or statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or 
approve the false claim.162 
As noted, FERA reversed this aspect of Allison Engine by changing the language of 
what was 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) to provide liability now for any person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 
material to a false or fraudulent claim.”163 Although FERA was enacted on May 20, 
2009, the statute expressly provides that the amendments to (a)(2) claims described 
above “shall take effect on the date of enactment . . . and shall apply to conduct on 
or after the date of enactment, except that . . . [the changes to (a)(2)] shall take 
effect as if enacted on June 7, 2008, and apply to all claims . . . that are pending on 
or after that date.”164 June 7, 2008—the date specified in this clause—is two days 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison Engine.165 
Several post-FERA district court cases touching on the meaning of this 
retroactivity provision have concluded that the provision does not apply to “cases” 
filed prior to the enactment of FERA.166 The circuit courts already appear to be split 
on the subject. The most prominent of the “retroactivity” cases is the Allison Engine 
decision itself. There, on remand from the Supreme Court, the defendants filed a 

 161. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 162. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2126 (2008) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 621–22 (6th Cir. 
2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008)).  
 163. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West 2009). 
 164. Id. § 3729(f)(1). 
 165. Compare id., with Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2123 (decided on June 9, 2008).  
 166. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Nos. 1:95-cv-970, 1:99-cv-923, 2009 WL 
3626773, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2009) (holding that retroactive application of the FCA amendments violates 
the Ex Post Facto Clause because it would impose punishment for acts that were not punishable prior to the 
amendments). 
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motion to prevent retroactive application of the (a)(2) changes.167 Defendants 
contended that retroactive application was either precluded by the plain language of 
the statute or unconstitutional.168 The plaintiffs, joined by the Department of 
Justice, argued that Congress intended for retroactive application to cases filed in 
the courts at the time of the Allison Engine decision and that the FERA changes pass 
constitutional muster.169 
The district court began its analysis by recognizing that the retroactive 
application of statutes is the exception rather than the rule. Statutes as a general rule 
may not apply retroactively “absent a clear indication from Congress that it 
intended such a result.”170 Noting that the “clear indication” standard is a 
“demanding one,” the court focused on the plain language of FERA.171 The plain 
language, cited above, provides that the changes made to (a)(2) take effect “as if 
enacted on June 7, 2008, and apply to all claims under the False Claims Act . . . that 
are pending on or after than [sic] date.”172 Thus, the issue is whether the “all claims” 
language refers to claims for payment or to legal claims (i.e., cases). 
The district court found that the use of the term “claims” instead of “cases” was 
important. Under the False Claims Act, a “claim” is a term of art that means “any 
request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property 
and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property.”173 While 
plaintiffs likely had a case pending as of June 7, 2008 against Allison Engine (since 
the complaint had been filed as of that date), there were no claims pending from 
Allison Engine on that date—as all of the claims at issue had been paid long before 
then.174 Based on what the district court viewed as a plain reading of the statute, the 
court concluded that the FERA amendments could not apply in this case.175 
The court found further support for its textual analysis in the legislative history 
of FERA, specifically the Senate Report, which uses the term “claims” to refer to 
requests for payment and the term “cases” to refer to civil actions for FCA 
violations.176 Similarly, a section of FERA that immediately follows the retroactivity 
clause provides that another FERA change “shall apply to cases pending on the date 
of enactment.”177 The court reasoned that the use of “cases” in one provision and 

 167. Id. at *2. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at *2–*3. 
 170. Id. at *3. 
 171. Id at *3–*4. 
 172. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
 173. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (West 2009). 
 174. Allison Engine, 2009 WL 3626773, at *3. 
 175. Id. at *4. 
 176. Id. (“The Senate Report’s explanation of FERA’s amendments to the FCA uses ‘claims’ to refer to a 
defendant’s request for payment and ‘cases’ when discussing civil actions for FCA violations.”). 
 177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(f)(1)).  
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“claims” in the other was intentional, and reflected that Congress intended for the 
retroactivity clause to apply only to claims pending as of June 7, 2008 and not to 
cases pending as of that date.178 
However, the court did not end its inquiry there. Instead, it proceeded to 
examine the parties’ constitutional arguments as an alternative to its statutory 
interpretation analysis. The court concluded that, if FERA did apply retroactively to 
cases pending before its effective date, such retroactive application would violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.179 While there are some laws that Congress 
can enact with retroactive effect, a law that “renders an act punishable in a manner 
in which it was not punishable when it was committed” violates the Constitution.180 
After exhaustively reviewing the legislative history of FERA, including a number of 
statements by the bill’s sponsors as to their intention to “punish” parties that 
defraud the government,181 the court concluded that Congress “intended to impose 
punishment” in enacting FERA182 and that, even if it did not intend to impose 
punishment, FERA “is so punitive . . . in purpose or effect as to negate [the 
government’s] intention to deem it ‘civil.’”183 The court cited a litany of cases noting 
the intent of the FCA to punish wrongdoers, as opposed to being remedial in 
nature, and cited to the treble damages and penalties under the Act as further 
evidence of an intent to punish past behavior and to deter future behavior.184 
Additionally, the court looked at the FERA changes under a prudential seven-factor 
test for determining punitive effect and concluded that “the civil version of the FCA 
is punitive in purpose and effect.”185 This conclusion reinforced the court’s prior 
finding that FERA does not apply retroactively to cases that were pending prior to 
its effective date. 

 178. Id. (“[T]he clear indication from Congress is that the revised language at issue here is applicable to 
‘claims’ pending on June 7, 2008, and not to ‘cases’ pending on June 7, 2008.”). 
 179. Id. at *7. 
 180. Id. at *5 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810)). For the court’s Ex Post Facto 
analysis, see id. at *4–*9. 
 181. See id. at *5–*6. 
 182. Id. at *7. 
 183. Id. at *8–*9 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)). 
 184. Id. at *7 (citing several Supreme Court and district court cases addressing the FCA’s damages 
multiplier). 
 185. Id. at *8–*9 (analyzing the FCA under the seven factors noted in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144 (1963)). The seven factors are: 
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether the sanction has 
historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether [the sanction] comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter; (4) whether operation of the sanction will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is 
already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assigned to the sanction; and (7) whether [the sanction] appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned. 
Id. at *8 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69). 
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Other cases decided since FERA’s enactment in May 2009 have reached similar 
results. For example, in United States v. Science Applications International Corp.,186 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to apply FERA 
changes retroactively to a case that was pending prior to May 2009.187 There, the 
government contended that Organized Conflicts of Interest (OCI) certifications 
made by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) under a technical 
support contract between SAIC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
were false, and that SAIC’s claims for payment under the contract thus constituted 
false claims.188 The jury found SAIC liable under pre-FERA standards and SAIC 
moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that the government had not met 
its burden of proof.189 In relevant part, SAIC asserted, with regard to the 
government’s (a)(2) claim, that the jury instruction, which eliminated the 
government’s burden to prove that “SAIC made false statements with the intent and 
for the purpose of getting its false claims paid,” was erroneous in light of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Allison Engine that the government’s obligation is to 
show that the defendant made the false record or statement at issue “for the purpose 
of getting a false or fraudulent claim for payment paid.”190 Because the OCI 
certifications were unrelated to the government’s decision to pay SAIC’s claims for 
payment, SAIC contended that the jury instruction was material error.191 
The district court rejected SAIC’s argument, noting that the statements at issue 
here (unlike those in Allison Engine) were made directly to NRC and that there was 
sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could have found that SAIC’s 
OCI statements were made for the purpose of having their claims paid.192 The court 
then turned to its analysis of the new FERA standards, including the addition of a 
“material” requirement in (a)(2). On this issue, the United States filed a separate 
motion (as it did in the Allison Engine remand case), arguing that FERA’s changes 
to (a)(2) apply retroactively to all “cases” filed on or after June 7, 2008.193 However, 
as in Allison Engine, the SAIC court also found that the retroactivity language 
applied to claims extant on or after June 7, 2008, not cases extant as of that date.194 
In another recent case, however, District Judge Roberts, the same judge who 
decided SAIC, apparently reversed his earlier view in that case, concluding, in 

 186. (SAIC), 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 187. Id. at 107. 
 188. Id. at 93–94. 
 189. Id. at 93–95. 
 190. Id. at 104 (quoting Memorandum of Defendant at 42, United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 
F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 04-1543)). 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 104–05. 
 193. Id. at 106. 
 194. Id. at 107; cf. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Nos. 1:95-cv-970, 1:99-cv-923, 2009 
WL 3626773, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2009) (“[A] plain reading of the retroactivity language reveals that the 
relevant change is applicable to ‘claims’ and not to ‘cases.’”). 
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United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., that “[b]ecause this 
suit was pending on June 7, 2008, the amended provision applies here.”195 The 
district court in Second Chance inexplicably does not discuss its holding in SAIC.196 
Another “retroactivity” issue under FERA is whether the changes made in 2009 
could be influential in interpreting ambiguities in the statute in cases that pre-date 
FERA’s enactment. The first case of this type is United States v. Aguillon.197 In that 
case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a health care provider, fraudulently 
overcharged Medicare for certain evaluation and management services that the 
defendant provided for his patients.198 Specifically, citing (a)(2), the plaintiff 
maintained that the defendant-physician billed for his services using a billing code 
that offered greater reimbursement rates than the code that plaintiff contends 
should have been used for these services.199 The court noted that the plaintiff had to 
plead four elements to support an (a)(2) claim: 
(1) the defendant made, used or caused to be made or used a false record or 
statement to get a claim against the United States paid or approved; (2) the 
claim was false or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew the record or 
statement and the claim were false or fraudulent; and (4) the claim was 
actually paid or approved.200 
Because the plaintiff did not allege that any false claims for payment were actually 
paid or approved, the court dismissed the complaint.201 
After analyzing the matter under pre-FERA law, the court proceeded to analyze 
the impact of FERA sua sponte because FERA had been amended “arguably to 
eliminate the actual payment or approval requirement.”202 The court applied the 
two-part test for retroactivity established by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products,203 which requires the court to consider: (a) “if Congress has 
unambiguously restricted the statute to prospective application” and (b) whether 
retroactive application would create “retroactive effects.”204 The district court noted 
that Congress had not unambiguously prohibited retroactive application of FERA.205 
To the contrary, the congressional record specifically provides that “courts should 

 195. No. 04-280, 2010 WL 623466, *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2010) (Roberts, J.) (emphasis added).    
 196. Id. (discussing FERA’s retroactive application); see also supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text 
(describing the SAIC holding regarding retroactive applicability).  
 197. 628 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Del. 2009). 
 198. Id. at 544. 
 199. Id. at 545–46. 
 200. Id. at 548. 
 201. Id. at 551. 
 202. Id. at 549 & n.10. 
 203. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 204. Aguillon, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
 205. Id.  
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rely on these amendments to clarify the existing scope of False Claims Act liability, 
[even if the alleged violations occurred before the enactment of these 
amendments.]”206 However, the court went on to hold that application of FERA 
retroactively would have retroactive effects because “it would increase defendant’s 
liability for past conduct.”207 For this reason, and because the court did not believe 
Congress had provided sufficient instruction in FERA to cause retroactive effects 
under Landgraf, the court declined to apply the FERA changes to the payment rules 
retroactively.208 
In sum, FERA itself appears to contemplate retroactive application of certain of 
its provisions. At the appellate level, although the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit declined to apply FERA to an FCA case that was filed prior 
to FERA’s effective date,209 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently 
concluded that “[t]he amendment to § 3729(a)(2) . . . was made retroactive to June 
7, 2008, applicable to ‘all claims under the False Claims Act . . . that [were] pending 
on or after that date.’”210 The Second Circuit accordingly held that “[b]ecause Kirk’s 
claim was filed in March 2005, and was pending as of June 7, 2008, the potentially 
applicable provisions in this case are former § 3729(a)(1) . . . and current                   
§ 3729(a)(1)(B).”211 It bears watching how other circuit courts of appeal will resolve 
these issues in the future. 
v. conclusion: fera increases risks for entities doing business               
with the federal government 
Many commentators have cautioned that FERA’s changes may have a number of 
unintended consequences for entities doing business with the federal government. 
First, FERA’s elimination of the FCA’s direct presentment requirement has been 
criticized as overbroad. For example, although Congress was disappointed with the 
decision in Totten, entities such as Amtrak are uncommon and represent “less than 
one-tenth of 1 percent of all False Claims Act cases.”212 
Second, eliminating the direct presentment requirement will inevitably result in 
a wider range of FCA cases, as direct presentment often operated as a restraint on 

 206. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 155 CONG. REC. E1295–1300 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. Berman)). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 550–51. 
 209. Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e conclude the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act does not apply retroactively to this case.”). 
 210. United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp., No. 09-1678-cv, 2010 WL 1292143, at *14 (2d 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-21, sec. 4(f), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625). 
 211. Id. (emphasis added). 
 212. The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most Effective Tool 
Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 31–32 
(2008) (statement of John T. Boese, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP). 
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the statute’s reach.213 While the pre-FERA presentment requirement served as a 
check against overly aggressive FCA suits, there is some concern now that almost 
any business in the chain of commerce under a government contract could be 
subject to liability under the FCA.214 This development, in turn, may lead to a flood 
of FCA litigation against remote federal grantees, involving the most discrete, 
insular cases of insignificant federal funding.215 
Moreover, by removing the intent to defraud the federal government 
requirement, FERA may result in unanticipated consequences regarding                   
§ 3729(a)(2) liability. As Justice Breyer observed at oral argument in Allison Engine, 
“government money today is in everything.”216 Just as the elimination of 
presentment may create additional, time-consuming litigation, the absence of an 
intent requirement could prompt new types of FCA cases, such as cases involving 
universities whose funding includes only a small amount of federal grants.217 
Finally, Congress enacted FERA to combat fraud principally in the mortgage and 
financial institutions area.218 However, FERA’s changes are more sweeping and may 
be more than was necessary in battling the financial crisis. As one commentator 
notes, “[w]hile the nominal targets of the recent amendments to the FCA are the 
financial institutions receiving stimulus funds and other federal assistance, the 
traditional defendants in FCA litigation, government contractors, will feel the brunt 
of this sweeping legislation.”219 Although Congress may have passed this legislation 

 213. See Gerard E. Wimberly et al., The Presentment Requirement Under the False Claims Act: The Impact of 
Allison Engine & The Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009, BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug. 2009, at 1, 10–11 
(describing a federal program to help homeowners repair or relocate after hurricane Katrina that was 
“administered by the state [Louisiana] through a quasi-public entity”). Prior to Allison Engine, a homeowner’s 
false claim would not trigger FCA liability because the claim would not be presented to the federal government. 
Id. at 11. However, this may no longer be true as liability may attach to both the state and the grant recipient. Id. 
 214. See id. at 11 (“Now, with the FERA amendments in place that broaden the scope of liability under the 
FCA, the potential exists for almost any business or company to be liable under the FCA.”). 
 215. See id. at 12. Again, while the FCA still requires presentment, the statute no longer specifies to whom 
the claim must be presented. See supra Part II.A.1. Instead, the entity to which the claim must be presented for 
liability to attach now includes any recipient of federal money if that money will be “spent or used on the 
Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.” 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West 
2009). 
 216. Comeau, supra note 122, at 512 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Allison Engine Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008) (No. 07-214)). Justice Breyer continued: “So if it’s in 
everything, then everything is going to become subject to this False Claims Act. And of course I exaggerate by 
using the word ‘everything,’ but only a little.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 36. 
 217. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2128 (citing United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 
488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 218. See Wimberly et al., supra note 213, at 6 (describing the stated goal of FERA). 
 219. Glenn V. Whitaker et al., Commentary, From Bad to Worse: Changes to False Claims Act Increase Risk to 
Government Contractors, GOV’T CONT. LITIG. REP. Aug. 10, 2009, at 1, 1; see also Charles R. Ching et al., In-
House Counsel Beware: The False Claims Act Might Impact Your Business, ACC DOCKET, Nov. 2009, at 56, 60 
(“Congress appears to have overshot the mark and imposed potential FCA liability on businesses, industries and 
transactions that have nothing to do with ‘unscrupulous mortgage brokers and Wall Street financiers.’” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 2 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 431)). 
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with an intent to limit the fraudulent behavior of financial institutions, there does 
not appear to be any clear limit to the FCA’s reach where federal dollars are 
involved. Indeed, government contractors may now be targeted for “regulatory 
noncompliance,”220 so long as there is some nexus between the government’s 
payment and the regulation in question.221 
On the other hand, while FERA undoubtedly brings needed clarity to a number 
of areas of FCA litigation—clarity that, in turn, should improve the uniformity of 
court decisions—a number of FCA interpretive issues remain for the courts to 
decide. In particular, although FERA relaxes many FCA liability requirements in 
favor of the government and relators, contractors and other defendants may 
continue to argue that claims submitted to the government based upon reasonable 
or good faith interpretations of ambiguous statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
provisions may not serve as the predicate for an FCA suit.222 The Supreme Court has 
not yet had the opportunity to resolve the arguably conflicting views of the various 
circuit courts of appeal on the scope of this defense, and thus it remains a viable 
option that defendants may assert even after FERA. This is especially so in the 
health care and defense contracting areas, where regulations are highly complex and 
subject to multiple good faith interpretations.223 
Accordingly, whether FERA will result in the overbroad sweeping changes about 
which some have cautioned remains to be determined in future litigation. But it is 
clear that certain requirements of the pre-FERA FCA—principally the presentment 
and intent requirements—have been relaxed and will not serve as the impediments 





 220. See Comeau, supra note 122, at 512–13 (stating that courts have historically held that the FCA is not for 
punishing mere regulatory compliance violations and cautioning government contractors that they may still 
need to “anticipate a proliferation of suits claiming the entire value of the contract in damages”); Whitaker et 
al., supra note 219, at *3 (“[G]overnment contractors . . . now face punitive liability never before contemplated 
by the FCA.”). 
 221. United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 717–18 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Even in the absence of an 
express certification of compliance, the knowing submission of claims by a person who has violated a statute or 
regulation that contains, on its face, a direct nexus to the government’s payment decision is also actionable 
under the FCA.”). Although Rogan demonstrates that such regulatory noncompliance was actionable even pre-
FERA, the revised FCA covers a wider range of federal funds and entities (e.g., Amtrak). See supra Part II.A.2. 
 222. Sarah M. Brackney & Matthew H. Solomson, Current Issues in False Claims Litigation, BRIEFING PAPERS, 
Sept. 2006, at 1, 5–7; Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Can a Reasonable Interpretation of a Contract Be Fraud?, 14 
NASH & CIBINIC REP., Mar. 2000, at ¶ 11 (discussing proving falsity and intent). 
 223. We note, however, that in the Court of Federal Claims—where contractors who sue the United States 
under government contracts pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006), are subject to counterclaims 
under the FCA—this issue has been resolved. Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 154 F.3d 1357, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen the contractor’s purported interpretation of the contract borders on the 
frivolous, the contractor must either raise the interpretation issue with the government contracting officials or 
risk liability under the FCA . . . .”). 
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